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ABSTRACT
The sustainability of structured biological, social, economic and ecological communities are often determined by the
outcome of social conflicts between cooperative and selfish individuals (cheaters). Cheaters avoid the cost of contributing
to the community and can occasionally spread in the population leading to the complete collapse of cooperation.
Although such a collapse often unfolds unexpectedly bearing the traits of a critical transition, it is unclear whether one
can detect the rising risk of cheater’s invasions and loss of cooperation in an evolving community. Here, we combine
dynamical networks and evolutionary game theory to study the abrupt loss of cooperation as a critical transition. We
estimate the risk of collapse of cooperation after the introduction of a single cheater under gradually changing conditions.
We observe a systematic increase in the average time it takes for cheaters to be eliminated from the community as the
risk of collapse increases. We detect this risk based on changes in community structure and composition. Nonetheless,
reliable detection depends on the mechanism that governs how cheaters evolve in the community. Our results suggest
possible avenues for detecting the loss of cooperation in evolving communities.
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1. Introduction
The sustainability of many biological, social, economic, and
ecological communities is determined by the interplay be-
tween individual actions and collective dynamics (Levin,
2007). The successful performance of a community is often
based on the cooperative attitude of individuals that pay a
personal cost to distribute general benefits (Nowak, 2006).
Nonetheless, although cooperation favors in general the suc-
cess of a community, it can also facilitate the appearance of
cheaters who take advantage of cooperators, spread in the
community, and may even cause its collapse (Levin, 2007).
The failure of cooperation in the presence of cheaters has
been observed in many systems at different scales. For in-
stance, cooperating cells of Pseudomonas fluorescens build
biofilms that help them to grow better while mutant cells
(cheaters) - that do not produce similar adhesive factors -
take advantage of the existing structure in order to spread
and to eventually cause the colony to collapse (Rainey &
Rainey, 2003; Popat et al., 2012). Fruiting bodies formed
under starvation by cooperative cells of Myxococcus xanthus
can also be invaded by cheaters leading to the disruption
of the fruiting body structure and forcing the cooperative
survivors to reinvest in reconstruction (Travisano & Velicer,
2004). At a different scale and in a different context shifts
in cooperation and cheating have been debated to be causes
of economic crises, (Haldane et al., 2009) as well as causes
for the ”tragedy” of common pool resources, (e.g., fisheries,
forests, etc.) (Congleton, 2007; Bowles & Gintis, 2011). In
all these systems a long-standing question has been to un-
derstand the mechanisms that allow cooperators to resist
the reproductive advantage of selfish cheating individuals
(Nowak, 2006). Among the many theoretical and experi-
mental studies on the maintenance of cooperation (Nowak,
2006; Ohtsuki et al., 2006; Rand et al., 2011; Sanchez &
Gore, 2013), scenarios where strategies co-evolve with pop-
ulation structure (Perc & Szolnoki, 2010) are of particu-
lar interest as they show how structural properties in the
population can affect the evolution of cooperation (Perc &
Szolnoki, 2010; Wardil & Hauert, 2014; Rand et al., 2011;
Sanchez & Gore, 2013). For instance, it has been shown
that not only the number of cheaters in the community is
important, but also how and to whom cheaters are con-
nected (Cavaliere et al., 2012). The interplay between the
way individuals are connected and the overall prosperity
of a system (Bascompte et al., 2010; Levin, 2007) endoge-
nously determines either the formation or the sudden col-
lapse of cooperative communities (Levin, 2007). Despite our
relative good understanding of the conditions that promote
the failure of cooperation in a community, it is still difficult
to predict whether the appearance of a cheater will cause
the eventual loss of cooperation (Congleton, 2007; Bowles
& Gintis, 2011). This is because it is hard to identify the
underlying conditions that increase the risk of collapse in
practice. Thus, it is crucial to develop alternative ways for
detecting the risk of collapse of cooperation in a structurally
evolving community.
Recent work has suggested that generic patterns in the
dynamics of a system can be used to infer proximity to
abrupt and unexpected changes termed critical transitions
(Scheffer et al., 2009). These dynamical patterns are generic
in the sense that they do not depend on the particular sys-
tem in question, but they are determined by the mathe-
matical phenomenon of critical slowing down (CSD) that
occurs prior to local bifurcation points (Strogatz, 2014;
Wissel, 1984). A bifurcation point represents a threshold
where a qualitative change in the equilibrium of a system
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takes place: the iconic case is the shift between two alterna-
tive equilibria at a crossing of a fold bifurcation. Close to a
local bifurcation, CSD implies that the system takes longer
to recover back to equilibrium after a disturbance (Scheffer
et al., 2009; Van Nes & Scheffer, 2007). In addition, the dy-
namics of the system become strongly variable (Carpenter
& Brock, 2006), and highly autocorrelated (Held & Kleinen,
2004). As such, decreasing recovery rate, rising variance,
and rising autocorrelation can all be used as early-warning
signals of approaching critical transitions (Scheffer et al.,
2009; Dakos et al., 2012), or more general as indicators of
loss of resilience (Dakos & Bascompte, 2014). CSD indi-
cators have been identified in a variety of systems: from
the collapse of cyanobacteria (Veraart et al., 2012), zoo-
plankton (Drake, 2005), and yeast populations (Dai et al.,
2012) in the lab, to changes in trophic structure in lakes
(Carpenter & Brock, 2006), as well as prior to abrupt past
climatic events (Dakos et al., 2012), and the onset of de-
pression in human patients (van de Leemput et al., 2014).
Despite limitations and challenges in detecting resilience
indicators (Dakos et al., 2015; Boettiger & Hastings, 2012),
growing evidence supports their potential use across dif-
ferent disciplines(Scheffer et al., 2012). The application of
such indicators for detecting abrupt transitions in struc-
turally complex communities is still, however, largely un-
explored. There are few studies that have highlighted the
emergence of tipping points in mutualistic communities of
plants and their pollinators (Lever et al., 2014), and the
detection of transitions in ecological(Dakos & Bascompte,
2014) and socio-ecological networks (Suweis & D’Odorico,
2014). Nonetheless, these studies assume a static structure
that does not allow changes in the interactions among net-
work components.
Here, for the first time to our knowledge, we com-
bine evolutionary game theory and dynamical networks to
detect the collapse of cooperation in an evolving (struc-
turally dynamic) community, using resilience indicators
for critical transitions. To do this, we adapt a network
model that displays cooperation collapses as consequence
of cheater’s invasions(Cavaliere et al., 2012). Evolution of
cheaters and cooperators is based on social inheritance:
newcomers copy strategies and connections of successful
role-models. Increased ability of newcomers to link to a high
number of individuals already present in the network allows
high prosperity but at the risk of facilitating cheater’s inva-
sions that can lead to the collapse of cooperation (Cavaliere
et al., 2012). We show that the collapse of cooperation oc-
curs in an abrupt non-linear way that resembles a crit-
ical transition. Prior to collapse we estimate a series of
indicators (structural and non-structural) that can signal
the increasing fragility of cooperation. Our contribution is
twofold. First, we demonstrate how the loss of cooperation
in evolving communities bears the features of a critical tran-
sition. Second, we develop a set of structural-based indica-
tors and state-based indicators for detecting approaching
transitions in structurally evolving communities.
2. Results
2.1. The Collapse of Cooperation in a Dynamical Network
Following the work (Cavaliere et al., 2012) we consider a
network model with a fixed number of agents (nodes) but
with a non-fixed number of links: to whom and to how many
neighbours an agent is connected varies during the evolu-
tion of the system. Each agent in the network can adopt
one of the two strategies of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. A co-
operator pays a cost c to provide a benefit b to all of its
neighbours. Cheaters pay no cost and distribute no benefit.
For instance, if a cooperator has m cooperative neighbours
and n cheating neighbours, its payoff is m(b − c) − nc. A
cheater in the same neighbourhood has payoff mb. The dy-
namics are defined by a discrete sequence of update steps
(Figure 1). At each update step a newcomer (invader) is
added and a randomly chosen existing node is removed so
that the number of nodes is constant asN . As the newcomer
has no specific strategy, a node i is selected as a role-model
with a probability proportional to its effective payoff EPi
= (1+δ)Payoffi , where δ ≥ 0 specifies the strength of se-
lection and Payoffi is the sum of pair-wise interactions of
each node. For δ = 0 the selection probability is same for
all nodes, while increasing δ makes it more likely that a
newcomer chooses a node with a higher payoff. After the
newcomer adopts the strategy of the chosen role-model, it
also connects with the role-model with a probability p and
with each of the role-models neighbours with a probability
q. The parameters p and q are called embedding parameters
as they determine the ability of the newcomer to imitate
the role-models social network.
cooperator
defector
role-model
invader
removed node
i.
ii.
p
iii.
q
q
Fig. 1. Evolution in a dynamical network. The dy-
namics follow three distinct update steps in the considered
model: (step i) A role-model is selected based on its effec-
tive payoff. (step ii) The invader (newcomer) connects to
the role-model with a probability p (dashed line), connects
to each of its neighbours with a probability q (dotted lines)
and emulates its strategy. p and q are called embedding
parameters. (step iii) A randomly selected node and all its
connections are removed from the network.
More importantly, the embedding parameters p and q
also determine the stability of cooperation (Cavaliere et al.,
2012). In particular, high levels of q rise the risk of collapse
of cooperation (level of p is less relevant, Figure S2 in the
Supplementary Material). To study how gradually increas-
ing q leads to collapse and slowly erodes the stability of co-
operation, we perform a series of perturbation experiments.
A perturbation experiment is defined as the introduction of
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an invader (e.g. cheater) in a network where all agents have
the opposite strategy (e.g. cooperators).
We start perturbations in a network of all cooperators
after we have iterated the model to establish a stable net-
work topology. We then introduce a cheater and we monitor
the system until either the cheater fails to invade, recovery,
or the cheater invades and cooperation collapses, collapse
(Figure 2). Using this approach, we evaluate the fraction
of perturbations that lead to the collapse for increasing
values of the embedding parameter q at different selection
strengths δ.
a b c d
e f g h
0
N
perturbation
t0 t1return time
Max-size
0
N
perturbation
t0
Max-size
Recovery Case:
Collapse Case:
a b
c
d
e f
g h
Fig. 2. Recovery and Collapse of Cooperation in
Perturbation Experiments. Recovery and collapse of
cooperation following the addition of a single invader in a
network with agents of the opposite strategy. We show the
two possible outcomes of a perturbation obtained by adding
a cheater in a network of all cooperators. The first row
shows the typical stages (and network topologies) of an un-
successful perturbation where cooperators resist, while the
bottom row shows the typical stages (and network topolo-
gies) of a successful perturbation where cheaters invade (in
both cases q = 0.8). Note the distinct network structure in
community of all cooperators (highly connected) and in a
community of all cheaters (highly fragmented)
This fraction represents the probability ψ of the intro-
duced cheater to spread and trigger the collapse of coopera-
tion. We call the complement of this probability cooperation
persistence (1-ψ). We find that cooperation stays uninvad-
able for a wide range of the control parameter q. Only when
q crosses a certain threshold, persistence decreases rapidly
(Figure 3A). Cooperation is doomed to fail and its loss oc-
curs in an abrupt non-linear way. Nonetheless, the exact
value of the threshold depends on the selection strength δ.
Higher δs cause an earlier but smoother collapse of cooper-
ation, and turn the probability that a single cheater invades
successfully almost equal to 1 (Figure 3A).
Once cooperation collapses, its restoration by re-
introducing a cooperator in a network of cheaters is dif-
ficult. In this reverse scenario, we find that although the
probability of a single cooperator to invade a network of
cheaters increases for decreasing the embedding parameter
q, it never reaches 1 (Figure 3B). This means that once
cooperation is lost it is difficult to be restored. This in-
dicates that the cheaters dominance equilibrium is much
more resilient than the cooperators dominance equilib-
rium. Restoring cooperation is only possible by inducing
a stronger perturbation: a simultaneous invasion of more
than a single cooperator (Figure S1 in the Supplementary
Material).
2.2. Structural and Non-structural Indicators for Detecting
the Collapse of Cooperation
The abrupt loss of cooperation raises the question whether
it is possible to detect it in advance. Measuring the strength
of parameter q is not only difficult in practice, but also
largely uninformative as for a range of low q, as there is lit-
tle sign of change in the persistence of cooperation (Figure
3). Thus, alternative diagnostic tools would be desirable in
order to estimate the rising risk of cooperation collapse.
Motivated by the possibility to detect upcoming critical
transition using generic indicators of resilience (Scheffer
et al., 2009), we explore whether we can use similar indica-
tors as precursors of the eroding stability of cooperation.
In particular, we evaluate two broad classes of indica-
tors: those based on the dynamics of the community com-
position (that we call non-structural) and those based on
the community structure (that we call structural). The dif-
ference between the two classes is that non-structural in-
dicators reflect changes in the numbers of cheaters and co-
operators (demographic changes), whereas structural indi-
cators reflect changes in the interactions between cheaters
and cooperators (topological changes). Among a variety of
metrics, we estimate two non-structural indicators: a) re-
turn rate, the inverse of the time it takes for the system to
recover back to its original state of full cooperation after
the addition of a single cheater (recall that time is mea-
sured in update steps in our model), and b) maximum size,
the maximal amount of cheaters possible to invade after the
introduction of a single cheater. We also estimate two struc-
tural indicators: a) average degree (or connectance), the av-
erage number of links of each agent in the network, and b)
the relative amount of cooperative interactions σ∗, that is
the fraction of beneficial interactions between cooperators
over the exploitative interactions between cooperators and
cheaters (see Methods for details). Other estimated metrics
are presented in the Supplementary Material (Section 7).
We estimate these four indicators after each perturba-
tion experiment at increasing values of the embedding pa-
rameter q and for different selection strengths δ. In Figure
4, we plot the median values from 20.000 perturbations
performed at each q (see Supplementary Material Figure
S6 for the distributions of all indicators). We find that
both non-structural and structural indicators change in dis-
tinct ways before cooperation collapses. In particular, we
compare trends among indicators up to the value of q at
which the probability of cooperation persistence drops be-
low 0.5. We use this threshold value as the most conserva-
tive choice for the onset of cooperation collapse. We observe
the strongest changes for all indicators close to the transi-
tion except for average degree when selection strength δ
is high (Figure 4D). In general, strong selection (δ = 0.1)
leads to more pronounced and earlier changes in the trends
when compared to weak selection (see Figure S3 in the
3
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Fig. 3. Persistence and Restoration of Cooperation.
(A) Persistence of cooperation as a function of the embed-
ding parameter q for various selection strengths δ. Note
the non-monotonicity of the curves (visible clearly in the
inset panel): for a low selection δ, the persistence of coop-
eration reaches a maximum before collapsing. As selection
becomes stronger, the persistence of cooperation decreases
monotonically. (B) Restoration of cooperation as a func-
tion of the embedding parameter q for various selection
strengths δ. Persistence probabilities are computed as 1−ψ
and restoration probabilities are computed as ψ, where ψ
is the fraction of perturbations that lead to the successful
invasion of the mutant out of 20.000 perturbation experi-
ments. Each perturbation is done by updating the network
of (A) all cooperators or (B) all cheaters for a long time
following the addition of a mutant at t0. (All results are
shown at p = 0.6; see Supplementary Material Figure S2
for different ps).
Supplementary Material for different selection strengths).
Perhaps most interestingly, return rate decreases before
that collapse threshold (Figure 4A,C). As decreasing re-
turn rates are signature of critical slowing down prior to
local bifurcation points (Van Nes & Scheffer, 2007), this
finding indirectly supports that the loss of cooperation in
evolving networks might be classified as a critical transi-
tion.
Structural IndicatorsNon-structural Indicators
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(A) (B)
(C) (D)
Fig. 4. Detecting the Loss of Cooperation. Structural
and non-structural indicators for detecting the loss of coop-
eration after the invasion of a single cheater at increasing
levels of embedding parameter q. Non-structural indicators
are 1) return rate (inverse of the number of update steps
the system takes to go back to its original state following
a perturbation), and 2) max-size (the maximal number of
cheaters recorded during a perturbation). Structural indica-
tors are 1) structural coefficient σ∗ that evaluates the ratio
between the cooperative interactions and the exploitative
interactions, and 2) average degree (the average number of
links per node). Upper row: weak selection, δ = 0.005; lower
row: strong selection, δ = 0.1. The black curves denote
cooperation persistence. The yellow shaded area identifies
the values of q where cooperation persistence falls below
0.5 (our defined threshold for cooperation collapse). Each
point of the indicators is the median estimated out of the
considering 20.000 perturbation experiments.
2.3. Assessing the Consistency and Early Detection of the
Indicators
Trends in the indicators are useful only if they are consis-
tently correlated to changes of the embedding parameter q
independently from the strength of selection δ. We test for
such consistency by computing trends in the indicators up
to the threshold where the cooperation persistence drops
below 0.5 (Figure 4). We first generate sequences of indi-
cator values by randomly selecting a value from any of the
perturbations at each q. Second, we computed the correla-
tion (quantified by Kendall τ rank coefficient) between the
constructed indicator sequences and the values of q (see
Methods). By comparing mean values of the estimated dis-
tributions of Kendall τs, we found that the trends in in-
dicators are generally consistent across different selection
strengths (Figure 5): the mean values keep the same signs.
However, when comparing the means and standard devia-
tions of the estimated distributions of Kendall τs, we found
that return rate, max-size and σ∗ are stronger when selec-
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tion strength δ increases. Average degree is the strongest in-
dicator regardless of whether the selection is weak or strong
(Figure 5).
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Fig. 5. Consistency of the indicators at different se-
lection strengths. Mean values and standard deviation
values of the distributions for Kendall τ rank coefficients
for increasing selection strengths δ. Non-structural indica-
tors are 1) return rate and 2) max-size; and the structural
indicators are 1) structural coefficient σ∗ and 2) average de-
gree. The average degree appears to be the most consistent
indicator as its distribution is almost always positive across
all selection strengths. In general, the consistence strength
is enhanced as the selection increases.
We also analyze how “early” an indicator accurately sig-
nals the increasing risk of collapse. Or, in other words, how
far from the collapse changes in the indicators significantly
signal the rising risk of cooperation loss. We do this by using
receiver operator characteristic (ROC) curves (Boettiger &
Hastings, 2012) that estimate true positive and false pos-
itive rates for all possible cut-off levels of the indicators
(see Methods). The larger the area under the ROC curve
(AUC), the more accurately an indicator identifies the risk
of cheater’s invasions. Areas below 0.5 mean that the indi-
cator trend carries no accurate information about the risk
of invasion. We compare the estimated area of the ROC
curves for each indicator across a range of observation win-
dow sizes (Figure 6). The size of the observation window is
inversely related to the distance from the collapse thresh-
old. Under weak selection, all indicators are poorly signal-
ing the increasing risk of collapse. Only at big window sizes
that include estimates close to the collapse, the accuracy of
the indicators increases (above 0.8 window size). Notably,
average degree is inaccurately detecting proximity to col-
lapse for most window sizes (Figure 6A). When selection
is strong (Figure 6B), all indicators more accurately signal
the rising risk of cooperation loss compared to the case at
weak selection (Figure 6A).
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Fig. 6. Accuracy in the early detection of the in-
dicators. We plot the area under the receiver operator
characteristic (ROC) curves (AUC) for structural and non-
structural indicators at weak and strong selections (δ =
0.005 and 0.1) with the change of observational window.
Non-structural indicators are 1) return rate and 2) max-
size, and the structural indicators are 1) structural coeffi-
cient σ∗ and 2) average degree. An observational window
defines the distance from the transition: a large window
corresponds to comparing changes in the indicators includ-
ing values close to the collapse of cooperation. An AUC of
1 represents a perfect test; an area below 0.5 represents a
worthless test. When the selection strength is weak, the av-
erage degree displays misleading prediction information as
the window size increases. In this scenario, the structural
coefficient σ∗ is generally the most accurate indicator. At
strong selection, all indicators are more accurate than those
at weak selection.
3. Methods
3.1. Model
We consider a network model with a fixed number of agents
(nodes) but with a non-fixed number of links: to whom and
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to how many neighbours an agent is connected varies dur-
ing the evolution of the system. Each agent in the network
adopts one of the two strategies of the Prisoner’s Dilemma.
A cooperator pays a cost c to provide a benefit b to all of
its neighbours; but the cheaters pay no cost and distribute
no benefit. For instance, if a cooperator has m coopera-
tive neighbours and n cheating neighbours, its payoff is
m(b − c) − nc. A cheater in the same neighbourhood has
payoff mb. We use b/c = 3 in our numerical experiments.
The dynamics of the system are defined by a discrete se-
quence of update steps (Figure 1). At each update step a
new node (a newcomer) is added and a randomly chosen ex-
isting node is removed from the system so that the number
of nodes is constant (in the main text we assume N = 100).
As the newcomer has no specific strategy, a node i is se-
lected as a role-model with a probability proportional to its
effective payoff EPi = (1+δ)
Payoffi , where δ ≥ 0 specifies
the intensity of selection and Payoffi is the sum of pair-wise
interactions of each node. For δ = 0 the selection probabil-
ity is same for all nodes, while increasing δ makes it more
likely that a newcomer chooses a node with a higher payoff.
A newcomer has the same strategy of the role-model and
connects with it with a probability p as well as with each
of its neighbours with a probability q (that means qk is the
probability that a newcomer connects to all k neighbours
of the role-model). The parameters p and q are called em-
bedding parameters as they explicitly determine the ability
of the newcomer to imitate the role-models social network.
In particular, the embedding parameter q determines the
ability of newcomers to link to a high number of agents
in the network. In this paper we focus on a version of the
model described in the work (Cavaliere et al., 2012), where
the newcomers always copy (no mutation is allowed) the
strategy of the selected role-model. The degree of compe-
tition, selection strength, is controlled by the parameter δ,
which determines the effective payoff. The standard model
(Cavaliere et al., 2012) where newcomers can select a differ-
ent strategy than the one used by the role-model has been
analyzed in the Supplement (Section 9).
3.2. Evaluation of the Indicators
We estimate two classes of indicators: structural and non-
structural. Non-structural indicators consider only the pop-
ulation composition, while structural indicators consider
the structure of the network. We compute structural and
non-structural indicators for each perturbation experiment.
A perturbation experiment consists of the introduction of
a mutant in a network where all agents have the opposite
strategy. We only compute the indicators in the scenario
of the invasion of a single cheater in a network of all co-
operators. This is done with the following procedure. A
network of all cooperators is updated for 1000 steps to re-
move transients. We then introduce a cheater newcomer.
The system is updated until one of the two outcomes is
reached: either recovery, the cheater fails to invade, or col-
lapse, the cheater invades and cooperation collapses. We
perform 20.000 of these perturbation experiments for each
value of the embedding parameter q increasing from 0 to 1
at an increment of 0.02. We use different selection strengths
(δ = 0.001, 0.005, 0.01, 0.05), but in the main text we report
the indicator results for weak (δ = 0.005) and strong selec-
tion strength (δ = 0.1). We identify by t0 the beginning of
a perturbation (the addition of the cheater) and with tend
the end of a perturbation (either recovery or collapse). For
each perturbation experiment, we compute the indicators
as follows regardless of whether a perturbation will lead to
recovery or collapse.
– Non-structural indicators
- Return rate is 1Return time , where the Return
time is the number of update steps the system takes
to go back to its original state following a perturbation.
Hence, if t0 is the step at which a perturbation starts
and tend is the step at which the population comes back
to its original state, then the return time is defined as
tend − t0. If the perturbation is successful, then the re-
turn rate is defined to be 0.
- Max-size (of cheaters) is the maximal number of
cheaters recorded during a perturbation to a network
of cooperators. It is the size N of the population if the
perturbation leads to collapse.
– Structural indicators.
- Structural coefficient σ∗:
σ∗ =
∑tend
t=t0
[CC]t∑tend
t=t0
[CD]t
(1)
where [CC]t is the total number of CC links (counted
twice), [CD]t is the total number of CD links in the net-
work at step t. Intuitively σ∗ evaluates the ratio between
the beneficial payoff (generated by purely cooperative
interactions) and the detrimental payoff (generated by
cheaters connected to cooperators). This coefficient is a
simplified version of the structural parameter studied in
the work (Tarnita et al., 2009b; Nowak et al., 2010).
- Average degree is the average number of links per
node recorded during a perturbation to a network of
cooperators.
3.3. Consistency of Indicators - Kendall’s τ coefficient
Given two pairs of data, e.g., (xi, yi) and (xj , yj), we say
they are concordant if xi > xj and yi > yj or if xi < xj
and yi < yj ; otherwise if xi > xj and yi < yj or xi < xj
and yi > yj then we say they are discordant. Suppose we
have two sequences (corresponding to two variables), each
with n data points, the Kendall’s τ coefficient between the
two variables is computed using the number of concordant
(cp) and discordant pairs (dp):
τ =
cp− dp
n(n− 1)/2 (2)
If the agreement between the two variable is perfect
the coefficient has a value of 1; if the disagreement is per-
fect then it has a value of −1; while if the two variables
are independent then it is 0. The coefficient can be inter-
preted as the probability of observing concordant pairs mi-
nus the probability of observing discordant pairs (Conover
& Conover, 1980).
Let’s denote q(x) as the value of q for which the per-
sistence of cooperation is x. For each indicator, we com-
pute the Kendall’s τ coefficient by constructing indicator
sequence whose length is the number of qs considered be-
tween q = 0 and q(0.5) and each corresponding value is
randomly chosen from 20.000 perturbations. In this way,
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a large number of sequences can be constructed until all
data are exhausted following a bootstrap approach without
replacement. The distribution is fitted as a Gaussian one
(Figure S4 in the Supplementary Material) through those
obtained the Kendall τ coefficients between each of these
constructed indicator sequences and the corresponding em-
bedding parameter qs.
3.4. Accuracy of Indicators - ROC curves
The observational window is from q = 0 to q′, and q′ ≤
q(0.5). For each q′ in Figure 6, we plot the area under the
ROC curve (AUC) that is computed using all (and only)
the data between q = 0 and q′. Specifically, for each indi-
cator we compute two distinct ROC curves in the following
manner —that correspond to two possible discrimination
conditions.
We use a cut-off c to define true/false positive/negatives
as follows. Given two arbitrary points q1, q2 between q = 0
and q′, with q1 < q2, we evaluate the values of the indicator
at q1 and at q2 and denote them by s1 and s2, respectively.
We denote by f(q1) and f(q2) the values of the cooperation
persistence at q1 and q2, respectively. Consequently, we can
define the true/false positive/negative by considering two
possible (symmetric) discriminatory conditions.
Condition (I):
– If (1 + c)s1 < s2 and f(q1) ≥ f(q2), then it is a true
positive (TP).
– If (1 + c)s1 < s2 and f(q1) < f(q2), then it is a false
positive (FP).
– If (1 + c)s1 ≥ s2 and f(q1) < f(q2), then it is a true
negative (TN).
– If (1 + c)s1 ≥ s2 and f(q1) ≥ f(q2), then it is a false
negative (FN).
Condition (II):
– If (1 + c)s1 ≥ s2 and f(q1) ≥ f(q2), then it is a true
positive (TP).
– If (1 + c)s1 ≥ s2 and f(q1) < f(q2), then it is a false
positive (FP).
– If (1 + c)s1 < s2 and f(q1) < f(q2), then it is a true
negative (TN).
– If (1 + c)s1 < s2 and f(q1) ≥ f(q2), then it is a false
negative (FN).
For a given cut-off c, we can produce a large number
of random indicator pairs (s1, s2) and corresponding coop-
eration pairs (c1, c2), which are picked between q = 0 and
q′. And then we can evaluate, for each indicator, the total
number TP, FP, TN and FN, using either condition (I) or
condition (II). Once these values have been obtained, we
compute the sensitivity and specificity for each indicator
as:
Sensitivity = true positive rate =
#TP
#TP + #FN
(3)
1-Specificity = false positive rate =
#FP
#TN + #FP
(4)
The calculated pair (sensitivity, 1-specificity) constitutes a
single point of the ROC curve. Repeating the described
process for all possible cut-offs c (from very small to very
large), we can obtain a set of pairs (sensitivity, 1-specificity)
that constitute a full ROC curve.
Each indicator has two possible symmetric ROC curves,
depending whether the condition used to determine FP,
FN, TP, TN is either (I), or (II). For convention, we
choose the one that gives the largest AUC when computed
within the largest observational window, and use that con-
dition to compute the ROC for all other observational win-
dows. For completeness, we report the ROC curves in the
Supplementary Material (Figure S5).
4. Discussion
Recognizing the conditions that favor the spreading of
cheating and the collapse of cooperation in a community
has been a major objective in the study of complex adaptive
systems(Levin, 2007, 2010; Bowles & Gintis, 2011). Here we
approach this issue from a different perspective and look at
the dynamics of cheaters, cooperators, and their interac-
tions to infer the risk of cooperation collapse. Specifically,
we argue that the collapse of cooperation resembles a crit-
ical transition in our structurally evolving communities -
an abrupt change in equilibrium state at the crossing of a
threshold. Although, it is difficult to analytically show the
nature of this transition, we find that return rate (i.e., the
inverse of the time necessary for a cheater to get expelled
from the community) decreases prior to the collapse in our
numerical experiments (Figure 4). Slow return rates resem-
ble the critical slowing down that is hallmark of proximity
to bifurcations points (Scheffer et al., 2009; Wissel, 1984),
but it clearly appears in our evolving complex communities.
Apart from decreasing return rates, we found that the
abrupt loss of cooperation can be detected in advance by
a handful of structural as well as non-structural indica-
tors that are not linked to critical slowing down (Figure
4). We show that the maximum size of invaders is increas-
ing relatively to the risk of collapse. Intuitively, this in-
dicator reflects the disturbance (in terms of invader num-
bers) that the community can tolerate without collapsing.
On the other hand, we use, for the first time, structural
indicators for detecting instabilities in network dynamics.
The few studies on critical transitions in networks assume
fixed topologies and use non-structural indicators to detect
species extinctions (Dakos et al., 2015; Suweis & D’Odorico,
2014). Network metrics, like connectance, assortativity, or
clustering, have been used as structural indicators applied
on spatial dynamical models where network structure was
derived from cross-correlation matrices (Tirabassi et al.,
2014; Viebahn & Dijkstra, 2014). However, these matri-
ces were static. In our communities, network structure is
not static but it co-evolves with the spreading of strategies
depending on the expected differences in payoff between
cheaters and cooperators. Clearly, the dynamic nature of
the structure of our communities permits to test indirect
alternative metrics for estimating the risk of abrupt tran-
sitions. Among the structural indicators we tested (Figure
4 and Figure S7 in the Supplementary Material), we show
that the decreasing ratio of beneficial interactions (between
cooperators) to detrimental ones (between cheaters and co-
operators) can be successfully used to detect the increasing
risk of cheater’s invasions (Figure 4). Moreover such indi-
cator is the most accurate when the strength of selection is
weak (Figure 6)
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Tests about the consistency and accuracy of the esti-
mated trends (Figure 5 and 6) strongly imply that there
is high uncertainty in detecting robustly the loss of co-
operation in an evolving community. Such uncertainty in
the detection of critical transitions of resilience has been
reported to be caused by a variety of factors (e.g. het-
erogeneity, non-linear dynamics, measurement error, strong
environmental stochasticity (Dakos et al., 2015; Boettiger
et al., 2013)). In our communities, we found that detection
is strongly dependent at least on the underlying level of
selection strength. This does not come as a surprise. For
weaker selection strength, cooperators are less disfavored
allowing them to persist even at high levels of the embed-
ding parameter q. This implies that all indicators, but av-
erage degree, can “pick up” the increase of fragility only at
very high values of q close to the collapse (Figure 5).
Clearly, our approach is limited as we considered the
dynamics of the communities after a single invasion. A
more realistic scenario would allow for constant invasions of
cheaters, or mutations of cheaters to cooperators as well. In
that case, cooperation would collapse and recover in an in-
finite sequence of such events (Cavaliere et al., 2012). When
we tested such more realistic scenario of long-term evolu-
tion with endogenous mutations, we found that most of
the indicators could still detect the increasing risk of co-
operation loss (Section 9 in the Supplementary Material).
Similarly, although we only tested a handful of indicators,
it appears that alternative metrics could also be used as po-
tential indicators to detect the cooperation loss (Figure S7
in the Supplementary Material). We also found that some
of the considered indicators (e.g. average degree) can detect
the collapse of cooperation even if in the absence of cheater
invasions (Figure S8 in the Supplementary Material).
Despite our work is based on a specific dynamical net-
work model, the approach and the indicators we developed
can be easily extended to other evolutionary models of dy-
namical structured populations (Lieberman et al., 2005;
Tarnita et al., 2009b,a). In these models, it is straightfor-
ward to measure the same or similar indicators and to eval-
uate their consistency. For example, average degree appears
to be a good indicator when the selection is either weak or
strong, but it is the relative number of interactions between
cooperators and cheaters that accurately detects whether
cheaters have better (or worse) chances to invade (Figure
6). Similar features of the indicators may be presented in
other models of evolving structured populations, where the
structural coefficients have been shown to be key for study-
ing the long-term level of cooperation (Tarnita et al., 2009b;
Nowak et al., 2010).
The presented results suggest that it is possible to eval-
uate the fragility of cooperation by monitoring interactions
and following the behaviour of individuals in a community.
In practice, however, such information might be difficult
to obtain. Identifying cheaters from cooperators, or even
following their interactions in time seems a daunting task.
Still, the difficulty for evaluating the proposed signals may
depend on the specific application, the type, and the scale
of the community in question. For instance, bacterial com-
munities are emerging as a promising experimental tool to
validate hypotheses in ecology and evolution (Velenich &
Gore, 2012). Testing the proposed indicators may be done
with cooperative cells that produce public goods. In such
bacterial colonies, in principle one could perform a series of
perturbation experiments by introducing cells of cheaters
(or invaders) and measuring return rate. Recent papers
have showed how structured cellular communities can be
used to measure critical slowing down in deteriorating pop-
ulations (Dai et al., 2013), even in the presence of cheaters
exploiting public good producing yeast (Chen et al., 2014).
Perhaps the most novel conclusion of this work is that
we can identify the progressive loss of cooperation by com-
bining non-structural and structural indicators. Although
the patterns we report might be idiosyncratic to our model
assumptions, they still confer a promising pattern. As such
our study paves the way for testing and developing simi-
lar indicators in a variety of evolving dynamical networks,
ranging from biological systems to ecological communities
and even socio-economic networks.
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